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STRATEGIC PATENTING AND
SOFTWARE INNOVATION*
MICHAEL NOEL†
MARK SCHANKERMAN‡
Strategic patenting is widely believed to raise the costs of innovating,
especially in industries characterised by cumulative innovation. This
paper studies the effects of strategic patenting on R&D, patenting and
market value in the computer software industry. We focus on two key
aspects: patent portfolio size, which affects bargaining power in patent
disputes, and the fragmentation of patent rights (‘patent thickets’)
which increases the transaction costs of enforcement. We develop a
model that incorporates both effects, as well as knowledge spillovers.
Using panel data for 121 firms covering the period 1980–99, we show
that strategic patenting and spillovers affect innovation and market
value of software firms, that there is a patent premium accounting for
20 per cent of the returns to R&D, and that software firms do not
appear to be trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma of ‘excessive patenting.’
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE IS AN EXTENSIVE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE THAT DEMONSTRATES that R&D
creates positive knowledge spillovers, which in turn contribute to produc-
tivity growth and subsequent innovation. This consensus lies at the heart of
modern theories of endogenous growth and is the primary justification for
government R&D-support policies.1 One of the main instruments govern-
ments use to increase innovation incentives is the patent system. However,
*We are very grateful to Bronwyn Hall and Heidi Williams for constructive suggestions,
and to Sharon Belenzon, Josh Lerner, Marc Rysman and Manuel Trajtenberg for comments
on an earlier version of this paper. We would like to thank Anne Layne-Farrar for her help
at early stages of this project, and the Microsoft Corporation and the Center for Economic
Performance at the London School of Economics for financial support.
†Authors’ affiliations: Department of Economics, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas,
U.S.A.
email: michael.noel@ttu.edu
‡London School of Economics and CEPR, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE,
England.
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1 Leading examples include Grossman and Helpman [1991] and Aghion and Howitt [1992].
For a recent survey of the literature, see Jones [2005]. In a recent paper, Bloom, Schankerman
and van Reenen [2013] show that R&D also creates negative (pecuniary) externalities through
product market rivalry which can lead to over-investment in R&D. But their empirical results
confirm that positive externalities dominate, with social returns to R&D exceeding private
returns, at least on average.
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there is growing concern among academic scholars and public policy
makers that patent rights are themselves becoming an impediment to the
innovation process. The argument is that strategic patenting by firms has
created a landscape characterized by a large number of patents, often with
fuzzy boundaries and fragmented ownership—so called ‘patent thickets.’ It
is claimed that these fragmented patent rights raise transaction costs, con-
strain the freedom of action for firms conducting R&D, and expose them to
ex post holdup through patent litigation. In this way, it is argued, the
growth of patenting has become a drag on innovation and capital invest-
ment. These dangers have been prominently voiced in public debates on
patent policy in the United States—e.g., National Research Council [2004]
and Federal Trade Commission [2011]—and in the growing concern over
the use of injunctive relief in infringement cases, as in the recent eBay
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court (eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 338 [2006]).2
These concerns have been intensified by the acceleration in patenting
over the past three decades, especially in high technology industries.
During the period 1976–1999 the total number of patent applications in the
United States (granted by 2010) grew at an average annual rate of 4.4 per
cent. The growth accelerated sharply from the late 1980’s, when there was
a pro-patent shift associated with the establishment of the specialized Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and other developments (Kortum and
Lerner [1999]; Jaffe and Lerner [2004]). In the period 1986–1999, aggregate
patenting grew at an annual rate of 6.7 per cent. This recent growth has
been particularly rapid in high tech industries—for example, 9.3 per cent in
pharmaceuticals, 9.2 in medical instruments, 26.9 in biotechnology, 15.8 in
semiconductors and 21.0 per cent in software (up to 1996). The rapid
growth in software patenting is due in part to judicial decisions during this
period that limited the scope of software copyright protection, while at the
same time extending the patentability of software (in particular, algorithms
not embedded in hardware).3
2 The eBay decision is generally seen as limiting the use of injunctions in order to prevent
hold-up. The dangers were voiced clearly by Justice Kennedy in a concurring opinion:
‘In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many instances the nature of the
patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent holder present considerations
quite unlike earlier cases. An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis
for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. . . . For
these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can
be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy
licenses to practice the patent.’
3 Key decisions included Computer Associates Int’l Inc. v. Altai Inc. 23 USPQ.2d 1241 (2nd
Cir. 1992), Apple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 35 F. 3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), and Lotus
Development Corp v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F. 3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995.) For a good discussion of
the changes in the legal environment for software patenting, see Hall and MacGarvie [2010].
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Previous studies have shown that firms, especially in high-tech industries,
try to resolve patent disputes by cross licensing agreements, patent pools
and other cooperative mechanisms (Lanjouw and Schankerman [2004];
Galasso [2012]). The importance of such mechanisms is greatest in
‘complex’ technology industries where innovation is cumulative and
requires the input of a large number of patented innovations from diverse
firms (Hall and Ziedonis [2001]; Ziedonis [2003, 2004]). In such industries,
fragmented property rights can impede R&D activity by constraining the
ability of firms to operate unless they have secured the required licenses of
complementary technologies. This position was first enunciated by Heller
and Eisenberg [1998], who labelled it the ‘problem of the anti-commons.’
By increasing the transaction costs of doing R&D, and the possibility that
bargaining failures block follow-on innovation altogether, patent thickets
provide an incentive for firms to develop defensive strategies, which we
refer to collectively as strategic patenting. However, there remains sharp
disagreement among economic and legal scholars about the scope and
severity of this problem.4
Strategic patenting encompasses two conceptually distinct issues, which
have not always been sharply distinguished in the literature. The first
aspect—which we refer to as defensive patenting—involves the accumu-
lation of patents to use as bargaining chits to preserve the freedom to
operate and to improve the bargaining position of the firm in resolving
patent disputes when they arise. The key is the link between patent port-
folio size and bargaining power. Having a larger patent portfolio puts a
firm in a better position to resolve disputes without incurring the high
costs of going to court, as well as securing a more favourable outcome in
those disputes. Defensive patenting can be costly, but the greater eco-
nomic concern is that it imposes a negative externality on other firms: by
increasing the firm’s bargaining power in the form of more ‘chits to trade’
in patent disputes, patenting by one firm raises the cost for other firms of
protecting or appropriating the rents from their innovations. In the
extreme case, this phenomenon could theoretically create a prisoner’s
dilemma in which all firms might be better off reducing patenting collec-
tively, but none is willing to do so individually. Some authors claim that
this actually occurs in complex technology industries, including semicon-
ductors and software (Bessen and Maskin [2009]). However, in this paper
4 For opposing views on the dangers of patent thickets in software, see Lessig [2001] and
Mann [2005]. Merges [1996, 2004] has been a leading voice arguing that firms find ways to
contract around patent thickets, and even strategically put some proprietary knowledge in the
public domain in order to pre-empt contracting problems. Walsh, Arora and Cohen [2003]
and Walsh, Cho and Cohen [2005] present supporting survey evidence in the context of
biomedical research activity.
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we will provide evidence for the software sector that is not consistent with
this dire prediction.
The second aspect of strategic patenting involves the link between trans-
action costs and the number of potential disputants. This is referred to in
the literature as the fragmentation of patent rights. When a firm faces many
firms with whom patent disputes may arise, transaction costs rise. Moreo-
ver, since disputes are normally resolved bilaterally (not collectively),
having to deal with many disputants makes bargaining failures more likely,
and creates the ‘complements problem’—value maximisation requires
coordinated resolution which is ignored by independent claimants (Shapiro
[2001]).
Despite widespread concern about patent thickets, the econometric evi-
dence on their effects is actually quite limited. The two leading empirical
studies are Hall and Ziedonis [2001] and Ziedonis [2004], both of which
focus on the semiconductor industry. The Hall and Ziedonis study shows
that patenting rose sharply in the 1990’s (after controlling for R&D and
other factors), especially for capital intensive semiconductor firms. While
indirect, this evidence is consistent with defensive patenting since the
danger of ex post holdup would be greater for such firms. Ziedonis [2004]
tests the hypothesis more directly by examining the relationship between
firm-level patenting and a measure of the fragmentation of patent rights.
She finds that patenting is higher (in the cross section of firms) when firms
face greater fragmentation of patent rights among rival firms. Both of these
papers focus exclusively on the impact of patent thickets on patenting
behaviour. Their impact on R&D investment and the stock market valua-
tion of firms remains unexplored.5
In this paper we study the impact of strategic patenting on the R&D,
patenting and market value of firms in the computer software industry.6
Like semiconductors, software is a classic example of a complex technology
in which cumulative innovation plays a central role. We develop a model
that incorporates both aspects of strategic patenting—portfolio size and
the fragmentation of patent rights—as well as knowledge spillovers. The
model generates testable predictions about the impact of strategic patent-
ing and knowledge spillovers on R&D, patenting and market value of
firms. All three externalities are related to the firm’s proximity to other
firms in technology space. We measure technology proximity using
5 While not specifically testing the patent thickets hypothesis, in an unpublished empirical
paper Bessen and Hunt [2003] argue that software patenting has actually reduced the level of
R&D. This highly controversial paper has been sharply criticised by Hahn and Wallsten
[2003].
6 In a recent empirical paper, Hall and MacGarvie [2010] also investigate the effects of
software and other patents on the market value of firms in the ICT sectors. However, they do
not analyse the effects of strategic patenting.
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information on the distribution of the citations contained in a firm’s
patents to different technology classes. In the empirical specification of the
model, we follow the approach developed in Bloom, Schankerman and Van
Reenen [2013], using multiple indicators of performance in order to help
identify the three types of externalities in which we are interested.7
Using panel data on ‘software firms’ in the U.S. during 1980–99, we find
evidence of both strategic patenting and R&D spillovers. First, we find that
that greater fragmentation of patent rights—which corresponds to higher
transaction costs—is associated with lower market value, but higher levels
of patenting and R&D. In the context of the strategic patenting model we
develop, the finding that fragmentation increases patenting arises because
patent accumulation is more important for resolving disputes when there
are more patent holders with whom to deal. The second finding is that
patenting by technology rivals reduces the firm’s market value, patenting
and R&D. This finding indicates the importance of bargaining power in
resolving patent disputes. Moreover, we show that the impact of strategic
patenting is significantly larger in the post-1994 period, when the courts
expanded the scope for software patenting. The third key result is that
R&D spillovers are important for the software firms in our sample.
Spillovers significantly increase patenting and market value, controlling for
the firm’s stock of R&D. Finally, we also show that there is a large ‘patent
premium’ in the stock market for these software firms, controlling for their
stock of R&D and other factors. Using our parameter estimates, we show
that this patent premium accounts for about 20 per cent of the private
return to R&D for these software firms. Our calculations also indicate that
firms would not be better off by collectively reducing their levels of
patenting—i.e., they do not appear to be trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma of
high patenting. Whether this is socially desirable, of course, is an entirely
different matter.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II presents the theoretical
model (details in Appendix I) and summarises the empirical predictions. In
Section III we describe the construction of the strategic patenting and
technology spillover variables. Section IV describes the data set. In Section
V we present the econometric specification of the three equations in the
model—market value, patenting and R&D. Section VI presents the base-
line empirical results and their implications, and Section VII summarizes a
series of robustness tests. We conclude with a brief summary of key findings
and directions for future research.
7 Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen [2013] develop a methodology for distinguishing
between the technology spillover and product market rivalry (business stealing) effects of
R&D, and apply it to a large panel of U.S. firms. They do not address the impact of stategic
patenting, which is the focus of our paper. To keep the framework tractable, we do not
incorporate product market rivalry into the model.
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II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
We consider a setting with two firms, denoted 0 and τ. We will refer to firm
0 as the focal firm. Each firm produces knowledge by investing in R&D, but
it also may benefit from technology spillovers from the other firm, which we
will call its technology rival. Each firm recognises that it generates as well
as receives technology spillovers. The knowledge production functions for
the focal firm and the technology rival are
k r r0 0 0= φ τ( , )
k r rτ τ τφ= ( , )0
We assume that φ1 0i > and φ2 0i ≥ and ϕi is concave in both arguments,
where i = 0, τ and subscripts 1 and 2 refer to derivatives with respect to the
arguments in ϕi. If there are knowledge spillovers, φ2 0i > , but theory does
not sign the cross partial φ12i . Knowlege spillovers raise the average product
of own R&D, but they can raise, lower or leave unchanged the marginal
product. As we will show later, this implies that the impact of knowledge
spillovers on the optimal choice of R&D investment is ambiguous.
We assume that patent protection (potentially) increases the rents that a
firm can earn from its innovations. Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) denote the fraction of its
knowledge that it protects by patenting, which we call the ‘patent propen-
sity.’ We let λ ≥ 1 represent the amount of rent that can be appropriated
from a unit of knowledge if it is patented relative to the rents if it is not
patented, which we call ‘patent effectiveness.’ Thus λ − 1 represents the
patent premium. The ‘effective unit’ of knowledge from an appropriation
perspective is given by θ0 = ρ0λ + (1 − ρ0). The focal firm’s variable profit
function is Π(θ0k0, w), which we assume is increasing and concave in k0, and
decreasing and convex in input prices, w. For notational simplicity we
suppress input prices in what follows.
Patenting is costly. The unit cost of a patent includes a fixed administra-
tive (application) fee denoted by c, and a patent enforcement cost denoted
by H. Enforcement costs depend on two features of the patenting environ-
ment in which the firm operates. The economic literature on patents
emphasises that transaction costs of patent enforcement are likely to be
higher when patent rights are widely dispersed (‘fragmented’) among dif-
ferent owners, rather than being held by a relatively small number of other
firms. When patent rights are more fragmented, it is more costly for a
patentee to contract with other relevant patentholders to conduct its R&D
activity, which is referred to by Shapiro [2001] as ‘navigating the patent
thicket.’ In addition to higher transaction costs, the risk of bargaining
failure in the negotiation over the required set of (patented) technological
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inputs is also greater when there are more distinct patentholders with
whom negotiations must be conducted.8
The second determinant of enforcement costs is the size of the patent
portfolio held by the firm. Using comprehensive data on patent litigation in
the U.S., Lanjouw and Schankerman [2004] show that the probability of a
patent’s being involved in litigation is much lower when that patent is held
as part of a larger portfolio, controlling for observable characteristics of the
patent and the patent owner. They argue that these economies of scale in
enforcement reflect the ability of larger firms to avoid disputes and to
resolve those that do arise in tacitly cooperative ways. In addition, having
a larger portfolio size puts the firm in a better bargaining position in
negotiations (improving the terms of any agreement), and increases the
potential threat to retaliate in the event negotiations of disputes fail. In
addition, firms with large patent portfolios avoid litigation through broad
cross licensing agreements that preserve their freedom to operate and lower
transaction costs (Galasso [2012]). For all these reasons, portfolio size
enables firms to reduce the costs of enforcing their patent rights effectively.
We refer to this as the ‘portfolio size effect.’
To capture these ideas, we assume that the enforcement cost for firm 0 is
a function of two factors: (1) the number of patents held by firm 0 relative
to firm τ, denoted by x kk=
ρ
ρτ τ
0 0 (the portfolio size effect), and (2) the degree
of fragmentation of patents held by firms in similar technology areas,
denoted by f (the patent thicket effect). Formally, we denote the enforce-
ment cost per patent by
H H x f= ( , )
H H H Hx xx f xf≤ ≥ ≥0 0 0 0, , , ≶
Relative portfolio size, x, is endogenous since the firm chooses its patent
propensity ρ0. We treat the fragmentation of patents by firms in similar
technology areas as exogenous to the firm.
By adopting a specification of the patent portfolio effect that depends on
the relative (rather than absolute) number of patents between a firm and its
technology rival, we highlight the idea that it might be mutually beneficial
for firms to reduce their propensities to patent, putting aside for the
moment the lower level of innovation rents that might result if there is a
patent premium. In other words, there may be a prisoners’ dilemma aspect
to strategic patenting, as Bessen and Maskin [2009] emphasize. In the
8 For discussion and evidence, see Heller and Eisenberg [1998], Ziedonis [2004], and Walsh,
Cho and Cohen [2005].
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empirical analysis below, we will use our parameter estimates to test
whether this prisoner’s dilemma actually operates for the software firms in
our sample.
The direct effect of higher fragmentation of patents among a firm’s
technology rivals is to increase its enforcement costs—that is, Hf ≥ 0.
However, there is also an indirect effect because greater fragmentation may
change the marginal value of accumulating patents to reduce enforcement
costs, which is given by |Hx|. This indirect effect can be either positive or
negative—it depends on the sign of Hxf. We find it most plausible that
greater fragmentation of patent rights increases the marginal value of
accumulating patent portfolios, which corresponds to Hxf < 0, because in
such cases firms are less likely to have effective methods of ‘tacit coopera-
tion’, apart from explicit patent trading arrangements, to resolve disputes
with different patent holders without litigation. We will show that this
hypothesis implies a testable prediction, which we will examine in the
empirical analysis.
Each firm has two decision variables: the level of R&D investment and
the patent propensity. The firm chooses these instruments to maximise the
market value, which is given by variable profit net of the cost of R&D and
patent application and enforcement costs. Focusing on the focal firm, we
can write the decision problem as
(1) max ( ( , )) { ( , )} ( , )
,r
V r r r c H x f r r
0 0
0
0
0 0 0
0
0
ρ
τ τθ φ ρ φ= − − +Π
Recall that the knowledge production functions k0 = ϕ0(r0, rτ) and
kτ = ϕτ(rτ, r0) enter the function H(x, f) since x
k
k=
ρ
ρτ τ
0 0 . In the specification
above, we assume that the enforcement cost H(x, f ) applies to all units of
knowledge, both patented and unpatented. The idea is that if a firm has
more bargaining chits in the form of patents, it can also more easily resolve
disputes over unpatented innovations.9
The first order conditions for the focal firm’s maximisation problem are
(2) V c H
k
k
k k Hr x0 1
0
0 1
0
0
0 0
1
0
0 2 1 0= − − −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ − − =φ θ ρ
ρ
ρ
φ φ
τ τ
τ
τ{ } ( )Π
(3) V k c
k
k
Hxρ
τ τ
λ
ρ0 0 1
0 01 0= − − −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎧⎨⎩
⎫⎬⎭ =( )Π
9 An alternative specification is to assume that the enforcement cost is higher for patented
innovations. We can do this by expressing unit cost as cρ0 + {(1 + μ)ρ0 + (1 − ρ0)}H(x, f),
where μ ≥ 0. The qualitative predictions in this specification are similar to those in the text.
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where the superscripts on ϕ and Π refer to the firm, while the subscripts
denote partial derivatives (1 refers to the single argument in Π, and 1 and
2 refer to the two arguments in ϕ).
The first term in equation (2) is the marginal benefit of R&D net of
patent enforcement costs. The second term is the reduction in marginal
enforcement cost from increasing the stock of knowledge, holding the
patent propensity constant. The sum of these benefits must equal the
marginal cost of R&D. In equation (3), the firm’s choice of patent pro-
pensity trades off the administrative cost of patenting against the
increased appropriation of innovation rent due to the patent premium
and the reduction in patent enforcement costs due to having a larger
patent portfolio.
For the empirical analysis, we use the model to derive predictions about
how R&D and patenting by the technology rival firm τ, and the fragmen-
tation of patent rights, affect the optimal choices of the focal firm 0.10
Appendix I provides the technical details of the analysis. As we make clear
in that appendix, we need two key ancillary assumptions to derive these
predictions, which we want to bring out here for clarity. These assumptions
are:
A1: (a) k kτ τφ φ10 0 2 0− > and (b) k k0 1 20 0φ φτ τ− >
A2: xHH
xx
x
<1
Assumption A1 says that a firm’s R&D has a larger impact on its own
knowledge production (in elasticity terms) than it does on its rival’s knowl-
edge (part (a) applies to firm 0, part (b) to firm τ).11 This seems natural since
a firm’s own R&D is presumably more closely tied to its innovation activity
than a rival’s (and only a part of the rival’s activity may in fact be relevant).
As is clear from the second term in equation (2), this assumption ensures
that an increase in own R&D has the effect of reducing enforcement costs.
Assumption A2 says that the elasticity of the marginal enforcement cost
function (Hx) with respect to portfolio size is less than one in absolute
value—i.e., that diminishing returns to portfolio accumulation are not ‘too
strong.’
10 In this analysis we treat firm τ’s decisions as exogenous to the focal firm. In the empirical
analysis we will show that the results are generally robust to using lagged internal instruments
to account for possible endogeneity issues.
11 Rearranging part (a) in A1 and multiplying through by r0, we get
r
k
r
k
0
0
1
0 0
2φ φ
τ
τ> The left
hand side is the elasticity of k0 with respect to r0 and the right hand side is the elasticity of kτ
with respect to r0. Analogously, multiplying through part (b) by rτ, we get
r
k
r
k
τ
τ
τ τ
τ
φ φ1 20> The
left hand side is the elasticity of kτ with respect to rτ and the right hand side is the elasticity of
k0 with respect to rτ.
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Together with Assumptions A1 and A2, the model generates predictions
about how the fragmentation of patent rights, patent propensity of rivals,
and technology spillovers affect the market value, patents and R&D of the
focal firm. Table I summarizes these predictions.
We can summarise the intuition behind these predictions as follows.
Starting with the market value equation, greater fragmentation of patent
rights among technology rivals means higher transaction costs for a firm in
licensing complementary patents and resolving patent disputes. This higher
enforcement cost reduces market value unambiguously ( ∂∂ <
V
f
0 0). Second,
when the patent propensity of technology rivals is higher, the focal firm
incurs greater enforcement costs, since they depend on the relative patent
portfolio sizes of the focal firm and its rivals. This also lowers market value
( ∂∂ <
V0 0ρτ ). Third, a rise in R&D by technology rivals increases knowledge
spillovers enjoyed by the focal firm and thus raises its market value
( ∂∂ >
V
r
0 0
τ
).
We consider next the patenting and R&D equations together. First,
greater fragmentation of patent rights means higher transaction costs for
the focal firm, which has two effects. The direct effect is to raise enforce-
ment costs for the focal firm, which reduces the profitability and thus the
optimal level of both R&D and patenting. However, there is also an indi-
rect effect because greater fragmentation changes the marginal incentive to
accumulate patents (and the R&D that creates them) in order to reduce
enforcement costs. The direction of this effect depends on the sign of Hxf.
If fragmentation increases the marginal value of accumulating patents
(given by |Hx|)—i.e., if Hxf < 0, which is what we would expect—then the
direct and indirect effects work in opposite directions and the impact on
R&D and patents is ambiguous. Conversely, if Hxf > 0, then fragmentation
must reduce R&D and patenting. Therefore, if we find that fragmentation
has a positive impact on R&D and/or patenting ( ∂∂ >
r
f
0 0, ∂∂ >
ρ0 0f ), we can
infer that Hxf < 0.
Second, an increase in the patent propensity of technology rivals raises
enforcement costs for the focal firm, and thus reduces the optimal level of
TABLE I
PREDICTIONS OF THE MODEL
Variable: Fragmentation, f Rival’s Patent Propensity, ρτ Rival’s R&D, rτ
Market Value, V0 ∂V0/∂f < 0 ∂V0/∂ρτ < 0 ∂V0/∂rτ > 0
Patent Propensity, ρ0 ∂ρ0/∂f ≶ 0a ∂ρ0/∂ρτ < 0 ∂ρ0/∂rτ > 0
R&D, r0 ∂r0/∂f ≶ 0b ∂r0/∂ρτ < 0 ∂r0/∂rτ ≶ 0
aIf ∂ρ0/∂f > 0, we can infer that Hxf < 0. If ∂ρ0/∂f < 0, one cannot infer the sign of Hxf.
bIf ∂r0/∂f > 0, we can infer that Hxf < 0. If ∂ρ0/∂f > 0, one cannot infer the sign of Hxf.
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R&D and patenting. ( ∂∂ <
r0 0ρτ and
∂
∂ <
ρ
ρτ
0 0).12 Finally, when technology
rivals increase their R&D, this raises the knowledge spillovers enjoyed by
the focal firm and thus its innovation output. This increases the the mar-
ginal returns to patenting and thus the focal firm’s patent propensity
( ∂∂ >
ρ
τ
0 0r ). However, the effect on its own R&D spending is ambiguous
because theory does not determine the impact of spillovers on the marginal
productivity of own R&D (i.e., the sign of ϕ12 is ambiguous).
We also want to point out that the use of multiple outcomes—market
value, patents and R&D—provides a stronger test of the model than we
would have from any single indicator. The market value equation provides
the unambiguous prediction on the impact of fragmentation (whereas the
impact on patents and R&D depend on the sign of Hxf). Each of the three
equations provides a (complementary) test of the effects of rivals’ patent
propensity, and thus a stronger overall check on this hypothesis. Finally,
we get two tests of the effects of R&D spillovers, one from the market value
equation and the other from the patents equation.
III. MEASURING STRATEGIC PATENTING AND TECHNOLOGY SPILLOVERS
The software firms in our sample have patenting activity in a variety of
technology fields. We need to take into account the potential technology
spillovers from R&D done by these firms in all of their areas of activity. The
standard approach (Jaffe [1986]) is to measure technological proximity
between firms as the uncentered correlation coefficient between their patent
distributions across patent classes, and then to measure spillovers as a
weighted sum of R&D by other firms using this proximity measure. We
follow a similar approach except that we use the distribution of a firm’s
backward patent citations across patent classes to measure technological
proximity. Our measure of backward citations for a firm includes all of
the citations made by that firm in the patents it has been granted up to that
year (excluding self-cites). Using citations, rather than patent counts, to
construct the proximity measure is appealing because patent citations iden-
tify the earlier (patented) technologies that the invention draws upon. The
12 There is also an indirect effect at play here: greater patent accumulation by technology
rivals reduces the relative patent portfolio of the focal firm, x, which increases the marginal
value of patenting by the focal firm since Hxx > 0. The net effect is revealed by the sign of the
cross-derivative Hρ ρτ0 . Using the enforcement cost function H(x, f) where x
k
k=
ρ
ρτ τ
0 0 , we get sign
H H xH Hx xx xρ ρτ0 1= − +sign{ ( )}. Under Assumption A2, we obtain Hρ ρτ0 0> , so we get the
prediction that greater patenting by rivals reduces the incentive for a firm to accumulate
patents.
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idea is that patent disputes are likely to be associated with these related
technologies. Economic research has shown that patent litigation is more
likely to arise when technological similarity is greater (Lanjouw and
Schankerman [2004]). To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to imple-
ment a citations-based proximity measure.
Formally, let W wi ik k
K
=
=
{ } 1 be the distribution of firm i’s backward cita-
tions across patent classes—i.e., wik is the share of firm i’s total citations to
preceding patents that fall into patent class k. Self-cites are excluded. Then
technology proximity between firm i and j is given by the uncentered
correlation coefficient between the citation distributions of the two firms:
(4) τ ij
i j
i i j j
W W
W W W W
=
′
′ ′( ) ( )
1
2
1
2
where τij ∈ [0, 1]. In the sample, there is large variation in the computed
technology distances between firms, with a median of 0.118 but varying all
the way from no overlap in citations (τ = 0) to perfect overlap (τ = 1).
Among the top five per cent of firm pairs in terms of our index of technol-
ogy proximity are Intel and IBM, Adobe and Apple, and Microsoft and
Sun Microsystems. As a robustness check, we also constructed the standard
Jaffe measure based on the distribution of patents. The cross sectional
correlation between the two technology proximity measures is 0.69, and the
econometric results are similar to those reported in Section VI when we use
the patent-based measure.
We measure technology spillovers as the weighted sum of other firms’
R&D stock, Gjt, using the technology proximity weights
(5) Spillover Git ij jt
j i
=
≠
∑τ
The R&D stock is constructed by initialising the stock at the beginning of
the sample period and using a 15 per cent depreciation rate.13
To capture the patent portfolio effect of strategic patenting, we compute
the weighted average of the ‘patent propensity’ (measured as the ratio of
the patent to R&D stocks) of other firms that are rivals in technology space.
The idea is that, given the stock of own R&D and technology spillovers,
firms facing technology rivals with higher patent propensities will face
higher enforcement costs, and be at a greater disadvantage in bargaining
over patent disputes. Let Z jt
PS
G
jt
jt
= denote the patent propensity of firm j,
13 Initial stock is defined as the intial sample value of R&D divided by the sum of the
depreciation rate and the average growth in R&D in the first three years of the sample. We
experimented with variations of this method and other depreciation rates with similar results.
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where PS is the stock of patents defined in the same way as the R&D stock,
G. The patent propensity measure is
(6) Patprop Zit ij jt
j i
=
≠
∑ω
where ω τ τij
ij
j i ij
= ∑ ≠ .
14
To capture the patent thicket effect of strategic patenting, we want a
measure of how many rivals a firm must negotiate with in order to preserve
freedom of operation in its R&D activity. The basic idea is that, when a
focal firm’s patent citations are more fragmented among technology rivals,
that firm will incur higher transaction costs in dealing with patent disputes
that may arise. Earlier studies of patent thickets employ measures of frag-
mentation based on how dispersed patenting is across firms in the same
technology field as the focal patent field (e.g., Ziedonis [2004]; Galasso and
Schankerman [2010]). By contrast, our measure is based on the number of
different firms cited by the focal firm in its patents.
To construct our fragmentation index of patent citations for firm i in
year t, we first identify the firm which owns (i.e., the patent assignee) each
patent that firm i cites in any of the patents in its portfolio in year t. From
this information, we compute the share of firm i’s backward citations that
is accounted for by each of its cited firms. Self-cites are excluded. The 4-firm
fragmentation measure is equal to one minus the share of these backward
cites that go to the top four firms. Formally, let sijt (i ≠ j) denote the share
of the total number of citations by firm i that refer to patents held by firm
j, cumulated up to year t, and arranged in descending order. The 4-firm
fragmentation measure is
(7) Fragcites sit ijt
j
= −
=
∑1
1
4
We also experimented with two alternative measures—an 8-firm fragmen-
tation index and a Herfindahl index, both based on the distribution of
backward cites as described above. The econometric results using these
measures are similar to those reported in Section VI.
14 We also experimented with an alternative measure that does not normalise the weights,
i.e, using τij rather than ω ij. Empirical results are similar to those reported in the text. The
non-normalised measure is less conceptually appealing because it results in a higher Patprop
when there are more technological competitors, for a given level of rivals’ patent propensity.
As such, the alternative measure blurs the distinction between the effects of patent propensity
and fragmentation in the technology market.
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IV. DATA
Our data set covers the period 1980–1999 and is constructed from three
sources. We use Compustat data on public firms for information on R&D
and components of Tobin’s Q: value of equities, debt and physical assets.
We use a variety of patent data from the U.S. Patent and Technology
Office, including the number of patents granted (dated by year of applica-
tion), the number of backward and forward citations, U.S. patent classifi-
cations and the identity of the assignee.15 In addition to using patent counts
in the patent equation, we use these data to construct technological prox-
imity and technological opportunity variables.
We focus on firms whose patents are predominantly in software. Unfor-
tunately, there is no patent class simply called ‘software’ so we need a
procedure that can sensibly identify software patents.16 One approach is to
do a keyword search on the USPTO database (this is the approach adopted
by Bessen and Hunt [2003]). This can be difficult, and problematic, because
many patent applications may contain the word software or other related
words but not be primarily about software itself. An arduous alternative is
to read each of the (thousands of) potential candidate patents and make a
subjective determination on each one (Allison and Tiller [2003]). A third
approach is to base the definition on a specific set of patent classes—e.g.,
Graham and Mowery [2003] use the classes most common to well-known
software firms such as Microsoft or Adobe. We adopt a related approach:
we define a software patent as any patent classified by the Patent Office in
International Patent Classification G06F (‘Electric Digital Data Process-
ing’). This single class accounts for about half of all patents issued to the
largest 100 packaged software companies, as tabulated by the trade publi-
cation Softletter [1998]. Fortunately, in a careful discussion of these various
alternative approaches, Hall and MacGarvie [2010] conclude that there is
considerable overlap in the resulting populations of ‘software patents’ and
that empirical findings are not particularly sensitive to the methodological
choice.
Software patents are taken out by firms in many diverse industries
(Shalem and Trajtenberg [2009]). Moreover, even ‘pure’ software firms are
likely to patent outside G06F, and may have genuinely non-software
patents. The firm with the highest specialisation in G06F patents for large
firms in our dataset is Microsoft—yet even it has only 71 per cent of its
patents classified in this category. Therefore, we define a software firm as
one which has at least 45 per cent of its patents classified as software
patents, after normalization by Microsoft’s G06F percentage. There are
15 Following the literature, we date patents by their application year because that is more
closely tied to measures of R&D and firm value.
16 For a good discussion of different approaches to defining software patents, see
Layne-Farrar [2005].
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149 publicly traded software firms that satisfy this criterion and also have
data on R&D and market value. Of these, 121 firms have complete data for
at least two consecutive years, and these constitute the final sample. We use
all the patents held by a firm, both software and non-software, because
R&D and market value refer to the entire firm. The 121 publicly traded
firms in the final sample cover the period 1980–99 and include 29,363
patents of which 12,507 are software patents. This sample accounts for
about 39 per cent of all G06F patents issued to public firms during this
period.17 About two-thirds of the firms (82 of 121) are classified in SIC 7372
(‘prepackaged software’), the remainder falling into various computer,
communications and semi-conductor classes. Appendix II (accessible
online at the publisher’s website) provides a list of the firms in our sample,
together with their primary industry (SIC) classification.
Finally, we must be careful to identify all patents held by each parent
firm for whom we have R&D and value information. A parent firm may
register a patent in its own name or in the name of one of its subsidiaries.
The fact that subsidiaries can be bought and sold makes matching the
patent to data from the parent firm more difficult. Hall, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg [2005] matched patent assignees to the parent firm for patents
for the period 1963–99 using 1989 ownership patterns. The resulting data-
base is known as the ‘NBER patent database’ since it resides at NBER.
However, for the group of software firms in which we are interested (some
of which were established in the 1990’s), the 1989 match is antiquated.
Therefore, for all firms that recorded at least one software patent between
1980 and 1999, we performed a new match of that firm to its parent and all
its subsidiaries, based on 1999 ownership patterns. We then linked all
patents of the subsidiaries to the parent company to produce a consolidated
account of patent activity of our sample firms. For every assignee in the
NBER patent database that had at least one G06F patent assigned to it, we
checked whether the assignee was a parent firm or a subsidiary to some
parent firm in 1999. If the firm was a subsidiary, we treated all patents of
that subsidiary to be the patents of the parent firm. If the assignee was a
parent firm, then we included it in our dataset if three conditions were met:
the firm was publicly traded, we had Compustat data for it, and the firm
met the 45 per cent G06F-to-total-patents cutoff, which is our lower limit
17 In the full Compustat data set of public firms, there are 3,441 firms holding 31,950 G06F
patents. More than a third of these patents (12,612) are held by five large firms: IBM, Hitachi,
Hewlett Packard, Motorola, and Texas Instruments. Of these five firms, only IBM satisfies
the software patent threshold we use (46 per cent of its patents are in the G06F class); the
others are well below a 30 per cent cutoff. Excluding IBM dramatically reduces the percentage
of G06F patents captured by the sample, from 39 per cent to only 18 per cent. We check
robustness of our empirical results by rerunning all of the econometric experiments and
computations using a 50 per cent threshold to define the sample, which excludes IBM. The
results were very similar to those reported in Section VI.
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for calling it a ‘software firm.’ The on-line Appendix II provides details on
the how the matching was done.
Table II provides some basic descriptive statistics. The sample firms are
large and R&D intensive, but with considerable heterogeneity in market
value, patents and R&D. Tobin’s Q is very high, as compared with other
industries. This mainly reflects the fact that software firms use relatively
little physical capital as compared to R&D, but also the over-valuation in
the high tech bubble of the 1990’s. There is substantial variation in the
patent propensity of technology rivals (Patprop). Patent citations are not
dramatically fragmented—the sample mean of Fragcites is 0.53, which
implies (in the symmetric case) that on average a firm cites about eight
other firms. It is also worth noting (not reported in the table) that the
average value of Patprop rose sharply after 1994 (when courts expanded the
scope for software patenting)—it was 0.028 in 1980–94 and 0.133 in 1995–
99. However, the fragmentation index does not change much between the
pre and post-1994 periods, despite the sharp increase in software patenting.
V. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
V(i). Market Value Equation
In the empirical specification, we follow the approach of Bloom,
Schankerman and Van Reenen [2013] in using three outcome measures:
market value, patents and R&D. In this section we discuss the econometric
specification of these equations.
We adopt the representation of the market value function originally
proposed by Griliches [1981]:
(8) ln( ) ln ln( ( ) )V A G Ait it v it= + +κ γ1
where V is the market value of the firm, A is the stock of tangible assets, G
is the stock of R&D, and the superscript ν indicates that the parameter is
TABLE II
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable: Mnemonic Mean Median Std. Dev.
Market Value V 2,462 97 10,886
Tobin’s Q V/A 6.5 4.3 6.7
R&D R 188.0 14.7 739.0
R&D Stock/Assets G/A 5.7 2.2 18.2
Patents (> 0) P 61.9 2.0 245.3
Patent Stock/Assets PS/A 0.62 0.17 1.44
Fragmentation Index Fragcites 0.53 0.62 0.25
Rivals’ Patent Propensity Patprop 0.080 0.075 0.064
R&D Spillovers Spillover 20,717 20,067 11,615
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel covering 121 firms over the period 1980–1999. Cells are computed
using non-missing observations. Dollar figures are 1999 values in millions.
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for the market value equation.18 The parameter κit is the shadow price of
physical capital, and γ ν is the ratio of the shadow price of R&D capital to
the shadow price of physical capital. The deviation of V/A (‘Tobin’s
average Q’) from unity depends on the ratio of the R&D stock to the
tangible capital stock (G/A) and the determinants of κit. We parameterize
the latter as
(9)
ln ln ln ln, ,κ β β βit v i t v i t vPatprop Fragcites Spillover= + +− −1 1 2 1 3 i t
i t
v v
I
v
t
v
it
vX
,
,
−
−
+ + + +
1
1 4β ξ η υ
where ξIv is a full set of four-digit industry dummies, ηtv a full set of time
dummies, Xitv denotes other control variables such as industry demand and
technological opportunity (explained below), and υitv is an idiosyncratic
error term.
The specification of the value function is nonlinear in the parameter γ ν.
If (G/A) were ‘small,’ we could approximate ln1 + γ ν(G/A)it by (G/A)it, but
this will not be adequate for many high tech firms (Hall and Oriani [2006]).
Therefore, we approximate ln(1 + γ ν(G/A)it) by a higher-order series expan-
sion, which we denote by Φ(G/A). We found that a fifth order polynomial
is satisfactory.
Taking these elements together, our basic empirical market value equa-
tion is
(10)
ln( ) (( ) ) ln ln, ,V A G A Patprop Fragcitesit it v i t v i t= + +− − −Φ 1 1 1 2 1β β
+ + + + +
−
−
′β β ξ η υ3 1 1 4v i t i tv v Iv tv itvSpillover Xln , ,
The predictions of the model are as follows: β1 0v < , β2 0v < , β3 0v > and
the marginal stock market valuation of R&D, computed from the coeffi-
cients of the polynomial Φ(G/A), should be positive.
Following Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg [2005], we also estimate an
extended version of the model that allows for the stock market to value the
patents held by a firm, above and beyond its valuation of the firm’s R&D.
The extended specification of the model treats the stock of patents, denoted
by PS, in the same way as the stock of R&D. The specification is the same
as equation (10) except that we incorporate a (fifth) order polynomial in the
ratio of the firm’s patent stock to fixed assets, Ψ(PS/A).19 This version
allows us to compute the market patent premium from the coefficients of
the polynomial Ψ(PS/A).
18 For a good discussion of issues arising in such specifications, see Hall, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg [2005].
19 We do not include an additional polynomial in the interaction term GA
PS
A because it is too
demanding on the available data.
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Since the software firms in our sample are classified into different SIC
industries, we include four-digit industry dummies in the market value
equation to pick up unobserved heterogeneity. Ideally we would want to
include fixed firm effects in the specification, but when did so we found that
it very hard to pin down any of the coefficients of interest. Hall, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg [2005] reach a similar conclusion. The reason is that going to
the ‘within-firm’ dimension means that we are trying to explain variation
over time in market value (around the firm mean), which can be very noisy.
In a first-differenced specification, the variation over time would be very
close to unpredictable, under the efficient markets hypothesis.20 The
‘within-firm’ estimator is not equivalent to first-differences, so it is possible
in some samples to exploit fixed firm effects successfully (this depends on
the time series properties of the data).21
In the market value equation, as in the patent and R&D specifications
described below, the interpretation of the Spillover variable can be difficult
because of the reflection problem (Manski [1991]). Any variable that shifts
the incentive for a firm to perform R&D and thus its market value will also
be likely to affect other firms that operate in similar technology fields. Thus
a positive correlation between R&D by technology rivals and the market
value (or R&D and patenting decisions) of a firm can arise either from
genuine technology spillovers or from common, unobserved demand or
technology opportunity shocks. Our defences against this problem are: (1)
we include controls for demand and technological opportunity (discussed
below); (2) the spillover variable is based on stocks of R&D, which should
mitigate correlation with contemporaneous shocks; (3) we lag the inde-
pendent variables, which should also reduce the problem; and (4) we are
particularly interested in testing the strategic patenting coefficients β1v andβ2v, which should be less directly affected by the reflection problem.
We control for the effects of demand and technological opportunity in
three different ways. First, we include a full set of year dummies in all
specifications. Second, we include two lag values of firm sales to pick up
remaining demand shocks.22 Finally, we construct a measure of technologi-
cal opportunity defined as the total patenting in a technology class
weighted by a firm’s closeness to that class, as captured by its backward
citations. The idea is that firms cite patents similar in nature to its own, and
20 Strictly speaking, under the efficient market hypothesis, the market value in period t
should not be predictable with information publicly available at t − 1.
21 Using a larger sample of firms from a broader set of manufacturing industries, Bloom,
Schankerman and Van Reenen [2013] are able to estimate a market value equation with fixed
firm effects.
22 We also constructed an industry sales measure for each firm, equal to a weighted average
of the sales in each of the four-digit SIC classes in which the firm operates. The weights are
constructed from Compustat information on the distribution of firm sales across SIC classes
which is available for the sub-period 1993–2001. Results using this control are similar to those
reported in Section VI.
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if there is a large amount of patenting in areas it cites, it is an active
technological field. Let W wi ik k
K
=
=
{ } 1 be the distribution of firm i’s back-
ward citations across patent classes (wik is the share of firm i’s total patent
citations to preceding patents that fall in class k), and PSjkt be the patent
stock of firm j in class k at time t. We define technological opportunity for
firm i as Techoppit = ΣkΣj≠iwikPSjkt. Two lagged values of Techopp are
included in the regression equations.23
V(ii). Patent Equation
Because patents are counts, we use a negative binomial count data model
that allows for fixed effects. The first moment of the model is
(11)
E P X Patprop Fragcitesit it
p
i t
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p
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The predictions of the model are β1 0p < , β2 0p ≷ , and β3 0p > .
Writing E P X xit it it p( ) exp( )| = ′β for shorthand, the variance is
V P x xit it p it p( ) exp( ) exp( )= ′ + ′β α β2 where the parameter α is a measure of
over-dispersion. The Poisson model constrains the mean and variance to be
the same, corresponding to the special case α = 0, whereas the Negative
Binomial estimator relaxes this assumption (empirically, overdispersion is
important in our data). We estimate the model by maximum likelihood. We
allow for unobserved firm heterogeneity using the pre-sample scaling
approach developed by Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen [1999]—this
uses pre-sample information on patents to control for heterogeneity. The
alternative approach using conditional maximum likelihood (Hausman,
Hall and Griliches [1984] is only consistent for strictly exogenous regres-
sors, which does not hold for our specification.
V(iii). R&D Equation
We write the R&D equation as
(12)
ln ln ln ln, , ,R R Patprop Fragcitesit r i t r i t r i t
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where ξir is a full set of firm dummies, ηtr a full set of time dummies, Xitr
denotes other control variables such as industry demand, and υitr is an
idiosyncratic error term. The predictions of the model are β1 0r < , β2 0r ≷ ,
23 We also experimented with measures using patent flows rather than stocks. Empirical
results were similar to those reported in the text.
STRATEGIC PATENTING AND SOFTWARE INNOVATION 499
© 2013 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
and β3 0r ≷ . In the R&D equation we include fixed firm effects to capture
unobserved heterogeneity.24 This specification allows for dynamics in R&D
investment by including a lagged dependent variable. As in the market
value equation, unobserved, transitory shocks to demand are captured by
the time dummies and a distributed lag of firm sales, and firm level vari-
ables on the right hand side of the R&D equation are lagged by one period
to mitigate endogeneity problems.
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
VI(i). Market Value Equation
Table III presents the parameter estimates for the market value equation.
The basic specification in column 1 strongly supports the predictions of the
model. First, not surprisingly we find that the firm’s (lagged) R&D stock is
strongly related to its market value. Using the estimated coefficients on the
polynomial in G/A, we find that a 10 per cent increase in the R&D stock is
associated with a 8.4 per cent increase in value. Evaluated at the sample
means, this implies that an extra dollar of R&D generates an increase of 96
cents in market value.25 This estimate is similar to the one found by Hall
and MacGarvie [2010] in their study of software patents (though they use
a different scheme for identifying software patents). It is also in line with
Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg [2005], who study a broader sample of firms in
diverse industries and estimate a marginal return to R&D of 86 cents.
However, as we show below, this figure underestimates the full marginal
return to R&D for software firms because there also is a large indirect
return in the form of a patent premium.
Second, we find that technology spillovers strongly affect the stock
market value. The estimated coefficient on Spillover is positive and statis-
tically significant, and implies that a 10 per cent increase in the pool of
technology spillovers is associated with a 1.7 per cent increase in a firm’s
market value. In absolute terms, the coefficient implies that a dollar of
additional Spillover is associated with an increase in market value of 13
cents. In other words, an extra dollar of technology spillovers is worth (in
terms of market value) about 13 per cent as much as a dollar of own R&D
for these software firms. This estimate of the impact of technology
spillovers (relative to own R&D) is larger than previous estimates that are
based on samples covering a range of different industries (e.g., Hall, Jaffe
24 The time dimension of the company panel is relatively long (mean number of annual
observations is 9.1), so the ‘within groups bias’ on weakly endogenous variables is likely to be
small (Nickell [1981]).
25 We compute the elasticity of market value with respect to R&D stock as eVG GA
G
A= ′Φ ( )
where Φ′ is the derivative of the polynomial Φ. The marginal value of R&D is ∂∂ = ′
V
G
V
A
G
AΦ ( ).
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and Trajtenberg [2005]; Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen [2013]),
which is consistent with the widely-held view that cumulative innovation is
particularly important in software.
Third, our findings strongly support the model’s predictions about stra-
tegic patenting—there is evidence that both fragmentation of property
rights (transaction costs) and relative patent portfolio size (bargaining
power) affect the market value of firms. Firms that face a more fragmented
set patent rights among rivals have significantly lower market value. This
TABLE III
MARKET VALUE EQUATION
Dependent Variable:
log(V/A)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
1980–99
Patent Premium
1980–99
Patent Premium
1980–94
Patent Premium
1995–99
Fragcitest−1 −0.344** −0.460** −0.188 −0.713**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16)
log Patpropt−1 −0.129* −0.122* −0.013 −0.276**
(0.074) (0.073) (0.110) (0.120)
log Spillovert−1 0.167** 0.187** 0.168** 0.155*
(0.050) (0.049) (0.074) (0.091)
log Firm Salest−1 0.185** 0.196** 0.021 0.253**
(0.065) (0.065) (0.120) (0.067)
log Firm Salest−2 −0.178** −0.160** −0.012 −0.183**
(0.062) (0.062) (0.120) (0.063)
log TechOppt−1 2.301** 2.449** 5.025** 0.670
(0.70) (0.70) (0.95) (0.84)
log TechOppt−2 −2.202** −2.377** −4.842** −0.740
(0.68) (0.68) (0.92) (0.80)
(G/A)t−1 0.092** 0.074** 0.045** 0.0139**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.024) (0.035)
(G/A)t−2 −0.003** −0.002** −0.002** −0.008**
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.003)
(G/A)3t−1 x 10
3 0.027** 0.024** 0.020** 0.195*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.110)
(G/A)4t−1 x 10
6 −0.109** −0.099** −0.085** −2.330
(0.020) (0.018) (0.038) (1.46)
(G/A)5t−1 x 10
9 0.149** 0.138** 0.120** 10.300
(0.027) (0.025) (0.046) (6.70)
(PS/A)t−1 0.712** 1.373** 0.967**
(0.21) (0.40) (0.22)
(PS/A)2t−1 −0.348** −0.846** −0.622**
(0.16) (0.30) (0.15)
(PS/A)3t−1 0.065* 0.202** 0.143**
(0.039) (0.079) (0.038)
(PS/A)4t−1 −0.005 −0.021** −0.013**
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003)
(PS/A)5t−1 x 10
3 0.146 0.734** 0.377**
(0.11) (0.29) (0.10)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
(p-values) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
(p-values) (0.066) (0.073) (0.47) (0.10)
No. Observations 865 865 399 466
R2 0.49 0.51 0.61 0.52
Notes: Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of equity plus debt, divided by the stock of fixed capital.
Estimation is by OLS. Newey-West standard errors (in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and first-
order serial correlation. Dummy variables are included for observations where Fragcites or lagged R&D stock
is zero. * denotes significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level.
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finding is consistent with the hypothesis that higher fragmentation
increases the transactions costs of settling patent disputes. The coefficient
on Fragcites is statistically significant and implies that a five percentage
point increase in the fragmentation index (this is a 10 per cent increase at
the sample mean) reduces market value by 1.7 per cent. We also find that
firms which face technology rivals with higher patent propensities have
lower market value. The estimated coefficient on Patprop is negative and
statistically significant, and implies that a 10 per cent increase in the patent
propensity of rivals reduces a firm’s value by 1.3 per cent.
Finally, the coefficients on the firm sales and technological opportunity
variables show that market value is positively related to the growth in
demand and the growth in technological opportunity, as measured by
aggregate patenting activity in the patent classes in which the firm operates.
This is confirmed by noting that the estimated coefficients on the first and
second lags of firm sales are nearly equal in magnitude but opposite in sign.
The same holds for the coefficients on the first and second lags of the
Techopp variable.
The basic specification relates market value to the firm’s stock of R&D,
as a proxy for knowledge. Since firms typically do not patent all of their
innovation output, R&D input is a more encompassing measure of knowl-
edge than simply using patents. However, as Schankerman [1998] empha-
sized, there may also be a patent premium for those innovations the firm
chooses to patent—i.e., their private value would be less if not patented.
This is a particularly contentious issue in software, and other sectors where
technology is fast-moving and cumulative. Some commentators have sug-
gested that patenting in such sectors does not contribute to private value,
and may even reduce it.
To investigate this hypothesis for software firms, we augment the empiri-
cal specification with a (fifth-order) polynomial in the ratio of the patent
stock to stock of fixed assets (denoted by PS/A). If there is a patent
premium, the patent stock should affect market value after controlling for
the stock of R&D. The results in column 2 shows clear evidence of a patent
premium. Using the estimated coefficients on the polynomial in PS/A
(evaluated at sample means), we obtain a statisticallly significant elasticity
of market value with respect to the stock of patents equal to 0.32 (standard
error = 0.084). We denote this elasticity by eV,PS. Thus a 10 per cent increase
in the patent stock is associated with a 3.2 per cent rise in market value,
holding the stock of R&D constant.26 In this extended specification, we also
can compute the elasticity of market value with respect to the R&D stock,
denoted by eVG. The point estimate is 0.71. Taken together, these findings
imply constant returns to scale with respect to innovation in the value
26 We compute this elasticity as eV PS PSA
PS
A, ( )= ′Ψ where Ψ′ is the derivative of the polyno-
mial Ψ.
MICHAEL NOEL AND MARK SCHANKERMAN502
© 2013 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
equation—a 10 per cent increase in both the stocks of R&D and patents is
associated with about a 10.3 per cent increase in market value. Nonetheless,
allowing for a patent premium in the specification of the market value
equation has almost no effect on the other coefficients in the model—in
particular, the coefficients on the technology spillovers and strategic pat-
enting variables remain virtually unchanged.
As we indicated earlier, the full return to an increase in R&D includes
both the direct market valuation of R&D and the indirect return through
the patent premium. Formally, we can express the total elasticity of market
value with respect to R&D stock as follows: EVG = eVG + eV,PS ePS,G. We use
the parameter estimates on the polynomial terms in G/A and PS/A (column
2 in Table III) to compute the elasticities eVG and eV,PS. To get the elasticity
of patents with respect to the stock of R&D, ePS,G, we use the coefficients
estimated in the patent equation which are presented later (column 2 in
Table IV). This computation yields the following decomposition:
EVG = 0.71 + 0.32 x 0.60 = 0.90. In other words, the direct effect of a 10 per
cent increase in the R&D stock raises market value by 7.1 per cent, but once
we account for the effect through the patent premium, the market value
gain rises to 9.0 per cent.
From this we conclude that the patent premium accounts for 21 per cent
of the total elasticity effect of R&D.27 This finding shows that patents are
important as a means of appropriating innovation rents in software. This is
noteworthy because of the frequent claims to the contrary.
One cautionary remark is in order. We interpret the patent premium as
reflecting the fact that patents enhance the ability of the firm to appropriate
rents from any given innovation output, relative to alternative methods of
protection. It is also possible that patents are simply serving as a (noisy)
indicator of R&D success, but do not affect the firm’s ability to appropriate
innovation rent. Since patenting is costly we expect firms to take out
patents only on their more valuable innovations, so the patent premium we
estimate from the market value equation may reflect the higher profit
stream associated with successful, above-average quality R&D. Unless one
had an independent indicator of R&D success, this second interpretation
cannot be ruled out. However, our estimated patent premium is broadly
in line with estimates, for a variety of industries, which are based on
27 We can also do the decomposition in terms of the marginal return to R&D (instead of
elasticities). Note that dVdG
V
G
V
PS
PS
P
P
G= +
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂ , where the last three terms constitute the patent
premium. We compute the first three derivatives from the estimated coefficients of the
polynomial Φ and Ψ. Using the relationship between the stock and flow of patents, we get
∂
∂ +=
PS
P r
1
δ where r and δ are the real interest rate and depreciation rate (we set r = .05, δ = .15).
We find that the patent premium accounts for 25 per cent of the full marginal return to R&D.
It is interesting to note that, in their study of software, Hall and MacGarvie [2010] found that
the elasticity of market value with respect to patents per R&D (controlling for R&D stocks)
is 0.30. This is similar to our computed patent premium.
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methodologies that are not subject to this interpretation problem.28 For
this reason, we conclude that software patent rights do in fact generate
private value.
One other important implication comes out of the empirical results. We
found patenting by its technology rivals reduces a firm’s market value (the
coefficient on Patprop is negative). As we pointed out in the introduction,
however, some researchers argue that patent regimes in complex technol-
ogy industries create a prisoner’s dilemma in which firms could be better off
by collectively reducing their levels of patenting. We can test this conjecture
using our parameter estimates. Suppose that all firms were to increase their
patenting proportionally. If they are trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma, this
scaling up of patenting would be expected to reduce the market value of all
firms, holding their R&D constant. In particular, the conjecture implies
that the sum of the coefficient on Patprop in the market value equation and
the elasticity on own patent stock (computed from the polynomial in PS/A)
should be negative. Our parameter estimates do not support this claim.
Using the estimates from column 2, we compute the sum of these elasticities
as −0.12 + 0.32 = 0.19 (standard error = 0.11), which is significantly differ-
ent from zero at the 10 per cent level. This result indicates that a propor-
tional increase in patenting by the firms in our sample increases the market
value of firms.29 To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to subject the
prisoners’ dilemma claim to an empirical test. While a definitive conclusion
for software, and other complex technology sectors, must await further
studies to confirm or refute our finding, the evidence here should raise
doubts about the empirical relevance of the claim.
As discussed in the introduction, the scope of software patent protection
was gradually increased, and software copyright protection reduced, in a
series of court decisions during the 1980’s and early 1990’s. These decisions
made it increasingly desirable for firms to protect software algorithms using
patents rather than by copyright as they had done previously. We want to
investigate whether the shift in patent policy, and the associated intensifi-
cation of software patenting, had any discernible impact on the market
valuation of R&D and patents for our software firms, or the effect of
strategic patenting variables on market value. It is sometimes claimed that
these policy changes made strategic patenting in software more important.
28 These include patent renewal models that estimate the value of patent rights from the
willingness of patentees to pay maintenance fees (Schankerman and Pakes [1986]; Pakes
[1986]; and Schankerman [1998]), and structural models using survey data of R&D and
patenting (Arora, Ceccagnoli and Cohen [2008]).
29 In our robustness analysis in Section VII, we also make this computation in an extended
specification of the patents and market value equations that adds a control for product
market concentration. In that specification, the sum of the estimated coefficient on Patprop
and the elasticity of own patent stock is even larger, 0.280 (standard error = 0.12), and
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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To examine this, we break the sample into two sub-periods, 1980–94 and
1994–99, and estimate the market value equation separately for each
period.30
Columns 3 and 4 in Table III presents the results. Two striking findings
emerge. First, we find no evidence that the shadow price of the R&D stock
changed as a result of the change in patent regime (the coefficients are not
reported, for brevity). We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coeffi-
cients on the polynomial in G/A are the same in both periods (p-value =
0.20). Second, although we do reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on
the polynomial in PS/A remained constant over the two periods (p-value
< .01), the implied shadow price of the patent stock does not change very
much between periods. We estimate it at 0.50 in the 1980–94 period and 0.39
for 1995–99. Similarly, the estimated marginal value of a patent is not
sharply different between the periods: $5.3 million versus $3.9 million.
Second, we find that the impact of the strategic patenting variables on the
market value of firms increased substantially in the post-1994 period.
Neither the fragmentation of patent rights nor the patent propensity of
rivals has any significant effect on market value in the earlier period. After
the policy shift, however, both fragmentation and the patenting by tech-
nology rivals reduce market value, as the estimated coefficients on Fragcites
and Patprop are negative and statistically significant.
One last point warrants mention. We interpret the strategic patenting
variables Fragcites and Patprop as capturing aspects of the costs of enforc-
ing patent rights as depicted in the model. However, one might worry that
our measures may simply be proxies for product market competition.
Greater fragmentation may proxy for low concentration (thus greater com-
petition) in the product market, which one would expect to reduce market
value. Similarly, Patprop might be picking up the effect from patenting by
product market competitors (who may also be technology rivals).
However, if this were the case, we would expect to see their impacts on
market value in both periods. The fact that Fragcites and Patprop have no
signficant effect in the first period suggests that they are not just serving as
proxies for product market competition. We conduct an additional check
of this alternative interpretation in Section VII.
In summary, we conclude that the change in patent regime was associ-
ated with a sharp increase in the importance of the strategic patenting
variables. At the same time, despite a large increase in the level of patenting
during this later period, we do not find a sharp reduction in the impact of
R&D or patents on market value. Evidently, whatever diminishing returns
that were associated with the intensification of software patenting appears
30 There are more observations in the second (shorter) sub-period because data are avail-
able for more firms. However, when we restrict the analysis to those firms that also appear in
the first sub-period, we get very similar results.
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to have been largely countervailed by the increased value from the strength-
ening of software patent protection. While this may at first seem surprising,
it is what we would expect to see if firms face roughly the same cost of
capital in both periods and are optimally adjusting their R&D and patent-
ing decisions to equalize the marginal private returns and costs from these
investments.
VI(ii). Patent Equation
Table IV presents the results for the patent equation.31 Not surprisingly, we
find that patenting is significantly related to the firm’s stock of R&D, but
there are sharp decreasing returns both in the model without and with the
control for unobserved firm heterogeneity (columns 1 and 2). Note that the
coefficient on the pre-sample patents variable is positive and statistically
significant (this holds in all specifications), which confirms that unobserved
firm heterogeneity in patenting behaviour is important. Using the specifi-
cation with the pre-sample control, the elasticity of patents with respect to
the R&D stock is 0.60 and statistically significant. This finding is broadly in
line with the extensive empirical literature on patent production func-
tions.32 Also note that the coefficients on our measures of technological
opportunity (Techopp) are surprising—they suggest that the growth in
‘technological opportunity’ reduces current patenting (the coefficients are
about equal in magnitude and opposite in sign). Since Techopp measures
the aggregate patent activity in the patent classes in which the firm oper-
ates, the estimated coefficients suggest a ‘fishing out’ interpretation—when
aggregate patenting growth is higher, the firm is less likely to generate
patented innovations from its stock of R&D.33 But some caution is
31 Two points should be noted. First, In all the empirical specifications in the table, the
estimate of the over-dispersion coefficient, α, is significantly different from zero. This result
rejects the Poisson model for patents (α = 0) in favor of the Negative Binomial specification.
Second, we also estimated the model using citation-weighted patent counts to capture vari-
ation in patent quality, and conditioning on pre-sample patent citations. The empirical results
were very similar to those reported in the table.
32 The R&D elasticity drops sharply if we include firm size in the regression, which is not
surprising since R&D stock is highly correlated with firm size. The case for including firm size
here is not compelling. Conditional on R&D, the decision to patent will depend on the
incremental profits from patenting relative to protecting those innovations by alternative
means. This will depend in part on the incremental sales associated with patenting, not the
level of total sales which is what we observe.
33 We experimented with alternative lags on Techopp and found that the ‘fishing out’ result
is robust—higher past growth in aggregate patenting reduces the firm’s patenting, conditional
on its R&D. One possible alternative explanation is that this result reflects resource con-
straints in a given field of expertise within the patent office. If a backlog of patent applications
in a field builds up, the probabilty that any given new patent application is granted within a
given time declines. Since our patent measure refers to patent grants, dated by their year of
application, this explanation would work only if firms delay their applications to the patent
office as a consequence of the backlog, which seems unlikely.
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warranted here, in view of our earlier finding that the growth in Techopp
increased the market value of firms.
Turning now to the key variables of interest, the empirical results
support the hypothesis that both strategic patenting variables and tech-
nology spillovers affect the decision to patent. First, there is strong evi-
dence that greater fragmentation (higher transaction costs) affects the
decision to patent. Higher fragmentation is associated with a statistically
significant increase in patenting. This finding is consistent with the earlier
evidence on semiconductor firms in Ziedonis [2004]. In the context of our
model, this finding implies that greater fragmentation increases the mar-
ginal value of accumulating a patent portfolio in order to enforce patent
rights (in the model, Hxf < 0). The point estimates are nearly identical, and
statistically significant, in the specifications without and with the the pre-
sample patent control. The effect is large—e.g., the point estimate in
column (2) implies that a 5 percentage point increase in fragmentation
(equivalent to a 10 per cent increase at the sample mean) increases pat-
enting by 12.8 per cent.
TABLE IV
PATENT EQUATION
Dependent Variable:
Patent Count
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Initial
Conditions
1980–99
Initial
Conditions
1980–99
Initial
Conditions
1980–94
Initial
Conditions
1995–99
Fragcitest−1 2.540** 2.553** 2.171** 2.785**
(0.38) (0.34) (0.42) (0.47)
log Patpropt−1 −0.210 −0.453* −0.808* −0.501
(0.24) (0.22) (0.33) (0.41)
log Spillovert−1 0.106 0.637** 0.542** 1.040**
(0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.23)
log R&D Stockt−1 0.761** 0.599** 0.578** 0.626**
(0.036) (0.043) (0.065) (0.052)
log TechOppt−1 −4.238* −6.328** −9.394** −6.686**
(2.07) (1.83) (3.14) (2.21)
log TechOppt−2 4.593* 5.982** 9.627** 5.386**
(2.08) (1.80) (3.06) (2.04)
log Presample Patents 0.368** 0.346** 0.272**
(0.052) (0.076) (0.073)
Overdispersion 1.161** 1.336** 1.005** 1.423**
(0.14) (0.12) (0.15) (0.17)
Industry dummies Yes No No No
(p-values) (<0.01)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
(p-values) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.028) (<0.01)
No. Observations 991 991 472 519
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.27
Notes: Estimation is based on the Negative Binomial Model. Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to
heteroskedasticity. A dummy variable is included for observations where Fragcites is zero. The initial condi-
tions in columns (2)-(4) are estimated with the ‘pre-sample mean scaling approach’ of Blundell, Griffith and
Van Reenen [1999]. * denotes significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level.
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Second, we find evidence that firms do less patenting, conditional on
their R&D, when they face technology rivals with higher patent propensi-
ties. The point estimate on Patprop is negative and strongly significant in
the specification with the pre-sample patents control. This finding is con-
sistent with the view that firms are in a worse bargaining position in
resolving patent disputes with rivals that have large patent portfolios,
which reduces their profitability of patenting. The effect is substantial—the
point estimate implies that a 10 per cent increase in the average patent
propensity of technology rivals is associated with a reduction in patenting
by the firm of 4.5 per cent.
Third, knowledge spillovers strongly affect patenting once we control for
unobserved firm heterogeneity (column 2). The coefficient on Spillover is
positive and highly significant. The spillover effect is large: a ten per cent
increase in spillovers is associated with a 6.4 per cent increase in patenting,
holding the firm’s own R&D stock constant.
Finally, we test whether the policy shift toward software patentability
increased the impact of patent portfolios or fragmentation on the patenting
behaviour of firms. To examine this hypothesis, we estimate the patent
equation separately for the pre-1994 and post-1994 periods (columns 3 and
4). The key results on R&D spillovers and the strategic patenting variables
hold for both sub-periods, but we do not find any significant change
between the two periods. While the point estimates on Spillover and
Fragcites are larger in the later sub-period, and the coefficient on Patprop
is smaller, the differences are not statistically significant.
VI(iii). R&D Equation
Table V presents the parameter estimates for the R&D equation. Overall,
the results are weaker than for the market value and patent equations. The
main result is that R&D investment is higher when patent rights are more
fragmented. The effect is statistically significant in the static model without
fixed effects (column 1), and holds up when we introduce dynamics or fixed
firm effects in the regression (columns 2 and 3, respectively). In the static
specification with fixed effects, the estimates imply an elasticity of R&D
with respect to fragmentation about 0.14—a 10 per cent increase in frag-
mentation only raises raises R&D by about 1.4 per cent. When we intro-
duce both fixed effects and dynamics in column 4, the point estimate is
broadly similar but no longer statistically significant.
As explained in Section II, the effect of fragmentation on R&D is
ambiguous, and depends on how fragmentation affects the marginal value
of patent accumulation as a means to reduce enforcement costs (i.e., on the
sign of Hxf). Our finding that fragmentation increases R&D implies that
Hxf < 0, which is consistent with what we found in the patent equation. This
means that having a larger patent portfolio is more valuable when patent
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rights are more fragmented among rival firms. This finding is consistent
with our expectations, since tacit forms of cooperation are less likely to
develop in such cases, making a large patent portfolio more important to
avoid and resolving disputes.
We do not find much evidence that the patent propensity of technology
rivals affects R&D. While the point estimates of coefficient on Patprop are
negative, as predicted by the model, and robust to introducing dynamics
and fixed firm effects in the model (columns 2 and 3, respectively), they are
not generally statistically significant.
Finally, we find that knowledge spillovers do not affect the R&D deci-
sion, once we control for firm fixed effects. While the coefficient on the
Spillover variable is positive when we include only industry fixed effects, the
point estimate becomes negative but statistically insignificant once we add
firm fixed effects (column 3). The latter is the preferred specification, as the
firm fixed effects are highly significant (p-value < .001). This does not
contradict the model, however. The predicted impact of spillovers on R&D
is ambiguous, as it depends on the sign of the cross derivative in the
TABLE V
R&D EQUATION
Dependent Variable:
log R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Static, no
firm effects
1980–99
Dynamic, no
firm effects
1980–99
Static firm
effects
1980–99
Dynamic
Firm effects
1980–99
Fragcitest−1 1.016** 0.198** 0.281** 0.124
(0.17) (0.10) (0.17) (0.14)
log Patpropt−1 −0.033 −0.060 −0.091 −0.075
(0.100) (0.056) (0.075) (0.059)
log Spillovert−1 0.214** 0.104** −0.156 −0.102
(0.096) (0.036) (0.140) (0.096)
log R&Dt−1 0.756** 0.410**
(0.033) (0.058)
log Firm Salest−1 0.952** 0.467** 0.709** 0.496**
(0.078) (0.048) (0.075) (0.075)
log Firm Salest−2 −0.219** −0.284** 0.029 −0.077*
(0.069) (0.039) (0.065) (0.048)
log TechOppt−1 0.906 −0.161 −0.070 −0.283
(1.03) (0.54) (0.82) (0.63)
log TechOppt−2 −1.162 0.087 −0.074 0.173
(1.04) (0.51) (0.77) (0.61)
Industry dummies Yes Yes No No
(p-values) (<0.01) (<0.01)
Firm dummies No No Yes Yes
(p-values) (<0.01) (<0.01)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
(p-values) (0.88) (0.52) (0.70) (0.71)
No. Observations 866 866 866 866
R2 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.97
Notes: Estimation is by OLS. Newey-West standard errors (in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and
first-order serial correlation. The sample includes only firms which performed R&D continuously in at least
two adjacent years. A dummy variable is included for observations where Fragcites is zero. * denotes
significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level.
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knowledge production function, ϕ12. Taken at face value, the finding here
suggests that spillovers do not materially affect the marginal product of
own R&D, even though our earlier findings that spillovers strongly increase
the number of patents and market value show that spillovers do raise the
average product of the recipient firm’s R&D.
Finally, we note that the coefficients of the time dummies (not reported)
show no evidence that R&D changed systematically over the sample
period. We cannot reject the hypothesis that these coefficients are jointly
zero in any of the specifications. This indicates that the expansion of
patentability over software during the 1980’s and early 1990’s was not
associated with any major changes in R&D investment by these software
firms, at least up to the end of our sample period. This finding contradicts
the claim by Bessen and Hunt [2003] that the expansion of software pat-
enting led firms to reduce R&D over this period. Of course, whether the
stronger patent rights for software will intensify innovation in this area
remains an open question.
VII. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
We conducted a series of robustness checks on the baseline results. In this
discussion we focus on the market value and patent equations, where the
baseline results were much sharper and more significant than in the R&D
equation.
Our sample includes both ‘software’ companies specialising in packaged
software (SIC7372) and ‘hardware’ firms classified in other related sectors
(e.g., computers) but doing significant levels of software patenting. The
incentives for strategic patenting may differ for these two types of firms—
hardware firms that are vertically integrated into software patenting (e.g.,
semiconductor firms) are more likely to have large capital investments in
plant and equipment that are exposed to ex post hold in the event of patent
litigation, and thus particularly inclined to accumulate patents to defend
against this danger and preserve freedom to operate in R&D (Hall and
MacGarvie [2010]). We run two separate checks to examine robustness of
our baseline results.
First, we check whether our findings are skewed by the presence of a few
dominant firms active in software patenting but not specializing in pack-
aged software. The top four of these firms—Cisco, Compaq, IBM and Intel
–account for 82 per cent of all patents, and 71 per cent of software patents,
in our sample. We re-estimate the baseline specifications of the market
value and patent equations including both firms in packaged software and
other sectors, but excluding these four companies (they are kept in for
purposes of measuring the pool of technology spillovers for all firms,
however). The results in Panel A of Table VI show that the baseline results
hold up. The sign and magnitudes of the estimated coefficients on the
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strategic patenting variables and knowledge spillover variables are similar
to the baseline estimates in column 2 of Tables III and IV.
Second, we check whether there are significant differences in the role
of strategic patenting and knowledge spillovers between the ‘software’
companies specialising in packaged software and the ‘hardware’ firms
classified in other sectors. To do this, we re-estimate the baseline specifica-
tions but now add interactions of the key variables of interest—Fragcites,
Patprop and Spillover—with a dummy variable for software (SIC7372)
TABLE VI
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Panel A. Exclude Top Four Patenting ‘Hardware’ Firms
Equation: Fragcites Patprop Spillover
Market Value −0.465** −0.131* 0.139*
(0.110) (0.072) (0.063)
Patents 2.342** −0.489* 0.797**
(0.39) (0.25) (0.20)
Equation:
Panel B. Software vs. Hardware Firms
Fragcites Patprop Spillover
Hardware
Software
Differential Hardware
Software
Differential Hardware
Software
Differential
Market Value −0.344** −0.157 −0.145* 0.107* 0.129* 0.117
(0.14) (0.19) (0.073) (0.049) (0.062) (0.084)
Patents 2.795** −0.718 −0.603* 0.027 0.638** −0.493
(0.55) (0.63) (0.26) (0.13) (0.15) (0.26)
Equation:
Panel C. Exclude Stock Market Bubble, 1998–1999
Fragcites Patprop Spillover
Market Value −0.306** −0.011 0.179**
(0.12) (0.084) (0.056)
Patents 2.268** −0.631* 0.604**
(0.38) (0.26) (0.10)
Equation:
Panel D. Instrumental Variables Estimates
Fragcites Patprop Spillover
Market Value −0.447** 0.038 0.184**
(0.092) (0.110) (0.040)
Patents 3.016** 0.203 0.443*
(Poisson) (0.40) (0.53) (0.21)
Equation:
Panel E. Control for Product Market Concentration
Fragcites Patprop Spillover Salescon
Market Value −0.428** −0.090 0.123* −1.454**
(0.120) (0.078) (0.054) (0.29)
Patents 2.538** −0.293 0.641** 0.967
(0.38) (0.25) (0.13) (0.60)
Notes: * denotes significance at the 5% level, and ** at the 1% level.
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firms.34 Panel B in Table VI reports the presents the results. The negative
impact of fragmentation on market value is not statistically different for
hardware and software firms. Moreover, patenting for both type of firms is
strongly and positively related to fragmentation, as in the baseline estimates,
implying that patent accumulation reduces enforcement costs more when
fragmentation is greater (Hxf < 0). However, consistent with the hypothesis
above, we find that patenting by rivals reduces a firm’s market value for
hardware firms while the effect for software firms is smaller and not statis-
tically significant (due to the positive interaction coefficient for software
firms). But the negative effect of Patprop on patenting is the same for both
software and hardware firms. Finally, knowledge spillovers in the market
value equation do not differ between hardware firms and those specializing
in packaged software. The point estimates indicate larger spillovers for
hardware firms in the patent equation (due to the negative coefficient on the
interaction term), but the difference is not statistically significant.
The third robustness exercise it to check whether the sharp bubble in
the stock market that occurred at the end of our sample period skews the
results, especially for market value. During the two years 1998–99, the mean
value of firms in our sample rose by 20.8 per cent, which is more than 37 per
cent of its total change over the entire nineteen year sample period. To check
this, we re-estimate the baseline specification dropping the years 1998 and
1999. Panel C in Table VI shows that the estimated coefficients are generally
robust. The main difference is that the negative coefficient on Patprop in the
market value equation declines and is no longer statistically significant.
Fourth, we examine whether the estimates are robust to allowing for the
potential endogeneity of the patent propensity of rivals and R&D
spillovers. In the baseline regressions we use the lagged values of these
measures (Patpropt−1 and Spillovert−1) in order to remove the effect of
contemporaneous shocks. Nonetheless, there could be serial correlation in
the shocks driving patenting and market value that might still contaminate
the estimates. To address this, we re-estimate the model using the second
lags of Patprop and Spillover as instrumental variables for their lagged
values. We use an IV Poisson model for this purpose.35 As Panel D in
34 It is interesting to note that the ‘software’ firms do not more heavily specialize in software
patents (patent class G06F) than the ‘hardware’ firms in our sample. Software patents
account for 39 and 42 per cent of total patenting for the two types of firms, respectively.
Ideally, we would like to be able to disaggregate each firm’s patents into software and other
patents and to incorporate both types into the analysis. Unfortuntately, the data were not rich
enough to allow us to get informative results with this approach.
35 The appropriate lag depends on the form of the serial correlation in the market value (or
patent) equation. If it is an MA(1) process, using the second lag as an instrument will be
consistent. To check further, we tried using the third lag as the instrument, which would be
appropriate if the error is an MA(2) process. The results are similar to those reported in the
table. We use the IV Poisson model for this experiment because there is no readily available
software for the IV Negative Binomial model.
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Table VI shows, the estimated coefficients of Fragcites and Spillover for
both the market value and patent equations are very similar to the baseline
coefficients in Tables III and IV. However, using instrumental variables, we
find there is no longer any significant effect of Patprop on either the market
value or patenting behaviour of firms.
The final issue involves the role of product market competition. The
model in this paper focuses on how fragmentation of patent rights and
patent portfolio accumulation by rivals affect patent enforcement costs,
and thereby the firm’s market value, patenting and R&D. However, the
impacts we find for our strategic patenting variables could be due, at least
in part, to the effects of product market competition rather than patent
enforcement costs. For example, we find that lower fragmentation of patent
rights increases market value. But this effect could be due instead to high
concentration of sales (less intense product market competition), if the
fragmentation of patent rights is negatively correlated with the concentra-
tion of sales. Our finding that greater fragmentation increases the patenting
might also be explained in this way if patent accumulation is more impor-
tant where product market competition is more intense. The effects we find
for Patprop could also be explained by product market competition, since
we would expect patenting by rivals to reduce the firm’s market value, and
lower its patenting (if rivals’ patents are a strategic substitute).
To address this alternative interpretation, we need to control for product
market competition in the baseline regressions. To this end, we construct a
measure of sales concentration (SalesCon) for each firm in each year, which
is equal to a weighted average of the four-firm sales concentration in each
of the four-digit SIC classes in which the firm operates. The sales concen-
tration data are taken from the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The weights are
constructed from Compustat information on the distribution of firm sales
across lines of business which are reported by firms from 1993 onwards.36
Panel E in Table IV reports the coefficients on the main variables from
the baseline specifications with this new control variable. The key finding
here is that the estimated coefficients on the strategic patenting variables,
Fragcites and Patprop, and R&D spillovers in the market value and patent
equations are very similar to (and not statistically different from) the
baseline coefficients in column 2 in Tables III and IV. This indicates that
our conclusions about the role of strategic patenting and spillovers are not
simply picking up the effects of variations across firms in product market
36 For details of the line of business data, see Bloom, Schankerman and van Reenen [2013].
For this computation we need to assume that distribution of a firm’s sales across lines of
business in 1993 applies to the earlier 1980–92 period. The four-digit SIC concentration data
are available in the U.S. Censuses of Manufacturing, Retail Trade and Whole Trade. Some
censuses were missing data for selected SIC’s (due to redefinitions of sectors), in which cases
we interpolated. For details, see the on-line Appendix II.
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competition.37 In addition, the positive coefficient on sales concentration in
the patent equation indicates that patents are, perhaps surprisingly, more
important for appropriating innovation rents when the market is more
concentrated. Lastly, the coefficient on sales concentration is negative and
significant in the market value equation. The most plausible explanation is
that entry (which reduces concentration) occurs in more profitable lines of
business and that, despite our demand-side controls, we may not be fully
accounting for their unobserved ‘potential profitability.’
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper studies the impact of strategic patenting and technology
spillovers on R&D investment, patenting activity and market value of firms
in the computer software industry. Software is a classic example of a
complex technology in which cumulative innovation plays a central role,
and where there is growing concern that patent thickets may impede inno-
vation. We develop a model to analyse and estimate the impact of strategic
patenting and technology spillovers. The model incorporates two distinct
aspects of strategic patenting: patent portfolio size to capture the firm’s
bargaining power in patent disputes and licensing, and fragmentation of
patenting among rivals to capture the transaction costs of enforcing those
patent rights. Using panel data for the period 1980–99, we find clear evi-
dence that strategic patenting and technology spillovers are present.
There are four key empirical findings in the paper. First, there are large,
positive technology spillovers from R&D for software firms. Second, pat-
enting by technology rivals reduces the firm’s R&D investment, patenting
and market value. Third, greater fragmentation of patent rights increases
both R&D and patenting by the firm (reflecting greater need to have an
arsenal of patents to resolve disputes when there are many players) but it
lowers market value because transaction costs are higher. Finally, there is
a large patent premium in the stock market valuation of these software
firms, which accounts for about twenty per cent of the overall private
returns to R&D investments.
37 Two points are worth noting. First, our measures of product market concentration
(SalesCon) and fragmentation of patent rights (Fragcites) is very low, only −0.06. Second,
following Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen [2013], we also use the information on the
distribution of sales across SIC industries to construct a measure of product market distance
between firm pairs in our sample. This is constructed as the uncentered correlation between
the sales distributions of firm pairs (as in equation 4, with Wi defined as the distribution of
firm i’s sales across SIC industries). The correlation across firm pairs between the technology
and product market distance measures is only 0.17, confirming that the technology distance
measure used in the construction of our Patprop and Spillover measures does not simply
reflect product market interaction.
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These findings show that, contrary to often-heard claims, patenting in
software appears to be valuable for firms. Our evidence suggests that
software firms in our sample are not trapped in a bad equilibrium of high
patenting, and that collective action to reduce patenting would not raise
their market value. However, the welfare implications of our results are not
clear-cut. Insofar as strategic patenting imposes negative externalities on
other firms—by increasing the fragmentation of patent rights and the need
to patent defensively—the level of patenting may well be socially inefficient.
Recent research shows that patent rights impede cumulative innovation in
human genetic research and in other complex technology fields with frag-
mented patent ownership (Murray and Stern [2007]; Williams [2013];
Galasso and Schankerman [2013]). Unfortunately, we are still a long way
from having a full assessment of how these social costs stack up against the
incentive effects of stronger patent rights.
APPENDIX I
ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL’S PREDICTIONS
We use the model to derive predictions about how R&D and patenting by the
technology rival firm τ, and the fragmentation of patent rights, affect the optimal
choices of the focal firm 0. The decision problem is
max ( ( , )) { ( , )} ( , )
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where superscripts on the functions Π and ϕ refer to the firm, the subscripts denote
partial derivatives with respect to the arguments in Π (one argument only), H and ϕ.
To simplify notation, we supress the arguments in functions. Differentiating
totally, we obtain
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Second order conditions imply Vr r0 0 0< , Vρ ρ0 0 0< , and A V V Vr r r= − >0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0ρ ρ ρ .
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In order to sign some of the predictions (details below), we make two assumptions:
A1. (a) k kτ τφ φ10 0 2 0− > and (b) k k0 1 20 0φ φτ τ− >
A2. xHH
xx
x
<1
Assumption A1 says that a firm’s R&D has a larger impact on its own knowl-
edge production (in elasticity terms) than it does on its rival’s knowledge (part (a)
applies to firm 0, part (b) to firm τ). Assumption A2 says that the elasticity of the
marginal enforcement cost function (Hx) with respect to portfolio size is less than
one.
From the first order conditions, and assumptions A1 and A2, we get:
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Using Cramer’s rule and the cross derivatives above, we get:
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Two final remarks on the predictions are in order. First, as indicated above, we
cannot unambiguously sign
∂
∂
r
f
0 and ∂∂
ρ0
f because they depend on the sign of Hxf. This
reflects the fact that a rise in fragmentation has two effects: 1) it increases the level of
enforcement costs and thus reduces the profit from any given level of R&D and
patenting, but 2) it changes the marginal value of accumulating patents and thus the
incentive to do R&D and patenting (this latter effect depends on the sign of Hxf).
However, using the cross partials Vprf and V fρ0 , we can show that
∂
∂ >
r
f
0 0 implies
Hxf < 0, and similarly
∂
∂ >
ρ0 0f implies Hxf < 0. We use this fact in the analysis of the
empirical results in the paper. However, we cannot infer the sign of Hxf if
∂
∂ ≤
r
f
0 0 or
∂
∂ ≤
ρ0 0f .
Second, the impact of a technology rival’s R&D on the market value of the focal
firm,
∂
∂
V
r
0
τ
, is ambiguous because a rise in the rival’s R&D has two countervailing
effects: 1) it increases knowledge spillovers for the focal firm, raising its market value,
but 2) the increase in the rival’s kowledge (and patents) raises enforcement costs for
the focal firm and reduces its market value. In the econometric specification, however,
we control for rivals’ patent propensity (ratio of patent to R&D stocks)—turning off
the second effect. Thus our empirical prediction is ∂∂ >
V
r
0
0
τ
.
A similar argument applies to the impact of a technology rival’s R&D on patenting
by the focal firm, ∂∂
ρ
τ
0
r . This effect is ambiguous because the rise in the rival’s R&D
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increases knowledge spillovers for the focal firm (which increases its patenting), but
also raises enforcement costs for the focal firm, reducing the profitability of patenting.
In the econometric specification, however, we control for rivals’ patent propensity, so
we get only the first effect operating. Thus our empirical prediction is ∂∂ >
ρ
τ
0 0r .
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